The Battle in the Coral Sea was the first and one of the most significant Naval engagements during WW 2 in the Pacific.
The resulting outcomes had far-reaching consequences for Japan, as well as thwarting their planned invasion of Australia.
It was a series of Naval engagements occurring not too far off our NE Coast from May 4 – 8, 1942. In this article, I will also briefly describe these outcomes – what they meant for Japan, the United States and for Australia!
But first, what was unique about this battle – it was NOT a conventional or traditional Naval engagement, but rather a series of engagements, five in fact, which were all conducted exclusively by aircraft.
For the first time ever, opposing Forces – that is the surface ships – never sighted, or fired upon each other!
And, the final engagement concluded at sunset on May 8, 1942.
First, some background which was the precursors to this, and other major engagements in the Pacific, including Midway and Guadalcanal which followed shortly thereafter:
The Dec 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour was Japan’s second play in their mission of Empire expansion throughout Indo-China and SE Asia. They had already invaded Manchuria and occupied it!
Such expansion would enable;
- Their access to a myriad of resources that they didn’t have
- Substantial economic growth for the Empire of Japan
- The establishment of strategically located military positions in order to defend their expanding Empire
And lastly, it would be the enabler to end European Colonial rule throughout the region.
To meet these objectives, they launched many simultaneous military operations, many of which were quite brutal, but nonetheless successful by way of invading and taking control of;
Hong Kong, Burma, SIAM (now Thailand), French Cambodia, the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, Timor, the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), Guam, Wake Island, the Marianas, New Britain, and the Anderman, Gilbert & Marshall Islands.
All these Sovereign Nations & Territories were now in the hands of the Japanese, and all within 140 days of their attack on Pearl Harbour!
Japan planned to use these conquered Territories to establish a Defensive Perimeter – significantly expanding their Empire, which was also referred to as Japan’s SE Asia Economic Prosperity Sphere.
Shortly after the war began, Japan’s Generals Staff had recommended the invasion of northern Australia;
First – to prevent the United States from ever establishing a forward base, or bases on Australian soil, because these would seriously threaten their expanding perimeter throughout the South Pacific, and,
Second – to completely isolate Australia which would effectively close down our east-coast sea-lanes, effectively taking us out of the war.
Hence the air attacks on northern Australia began with Darwin on February 19, 1942, which on that day saw Darwin almost obliterated. And, over the ensuing 18 months, there were a further 96 air-attacks on Australia soil extending from Exmouth in WA to Townsville in northern QLD.
Interestingly, Admiral Inoeu – Commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Fourth Fleet (which comprised all Naval units in the South Pacific) disagreed, in-fact he strongly disagreed.
He advocated for the occupation of Tulagi Island in the Solomon’s, and Port Moresby in NG before the invasion of mainland Australia.
The Admiral argued that with Tulagi and Moresby in Japan’s corner, Australia still remained well within range of their land-based aircraft, and so an attack on Australian soil would occur when Japanese Military Planners deemed the time was appropriate! Admiral Inoeu believed the capture and control of both Tulagi and Moresby in the first instance, would provide greater defensive depth AND security for their major base at Rabaul on New Britain, as they sought to continue to expand their perimeter throughout the South Pacific.
Japan’s Generals Staff and the I J A accepted Inoeu’s proposal and promoted further operations, using these locations as supporting bases, to seize New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, Fiji and Samoa; AND thereby completely severing the supply and communications between Australia, Hawaii and the United States.
The Plan:
By early April 1942, Japanese Military Leaders had developed a plan which they named Operation MO.
This plan called for Port Moresby to be invaded from the sea and secured by May 10th.
The plan also included the capture of Tulagi Island by May 4, where they would establish a sea-plane base. From here they would conduct air operations against Allied Forces and Territories throughout the South Pacific.
Tulagi Island would also serve as a major base for their aircraft.
The Imperial Japanese Navy would also seize Nauru and Ocean Island for their phosphate deposits, and indeed they did on May 15th.
As indicated, further operations directed at New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, Fiji and Samoa were also planned under Operation RV, once Operation MO was successfully completed.
The Preparation:
Admiral Yamamoto, the Supreme Japanese Naval Commander detached many of his large warships, including two Heavy Fleet carriers, the Shokaku and Zuikaku, a Light Carrier, the Shoho, a Cruiser Division, and two Destroyer Divisions to support Operation MO, and he placed Admiral Inoeu in charge of Naval operations.
His Force now comprised of 48 ships.
Yamamoto was in the mean-time devising a plan to lure U.S. Navy carriers, none of which had been damaged in the Pearl Harbor attack, into a decisive show-down in June, in the central Pacific near Midway Atoll.
US Carriers by this time were attacking Japanese-held bases in the central Pacific, and furthermore, the Doolittle raid on Tokyo using medium bombers launched from the carrier USS Hornet from well within Japan’s defensive perimeter further encouraged Yamamoto to set up an all-out Carrier show-down.
Now, with regard to Operation MO, the United States had in-fact learned of the Japanese plan through code breaking intelligence and so they immediately sent two Carrier Task Forces and a Cruiser Force to the area.
One Carrier Group sailed from Pearl Harbor, the other from the New Hebrides region where it was at the time, and the Cruiser Force sailed from Sydney.
Admiral Fletcher USN was placed in overall command.
The Australian contingent comprised of the heavy cruiser HMAS Australia and the cruiser HMAS Hobart plus the Cruiser USS Chicago and three US Destroyers.
This Task Group was under the Command of RADM Jack Crace Royal Navy, who was serving as the Australian Pacific Squadron Commander at the time.
By May 4, Japanese Forces had successfully invaded and occupied Tulagi Island, although three of their supporting ships were sunk and four were damaged in surprise attacks by aircraft launched from the Carrier Yorktown, which had sped to a position 100 miles south of Tulagi when Australian Coast-watchers, specifically Lieutenant W J Read RANVR, had alerted authorities to Japanese invasion of Tulagi.
Off-course now aware of the presence of U S carriers in the area, at least one anyway, the Japanese Fleet carriers weighed anchor and sailed towards the Coral Sea from their position north of Rabaul with the intention of locating and destroying all Allied Naval Forces.
Admiral Inoeu’s Task Force was moving rapidly down the eastern flank of the Solomon’s in a wide arc to avoid detection, and by mid-day on May 5, the was east of San Christobal Island.
What has perplexed military historians and strategists for years is the fact that No searches were conducted by either Forces on May 5. The Japanese leaving reconnaissance to their 25th Air Flotilla based at Rabaul.
ADM Fletcher’s Task Force comprising of 26 ships invested the day in re-fuelling, while simultaneously planning operations for May 6, still unaware of the position of the Japanese Carrier Task Force!
Interestingly, and this is hindsight, had the Japanese Forces conducted searches using their own carrier-borne aircraft, they would have surely sighted the US Task Force – engaged in refuelling and thus the whole shooting match could have been over by sunset on May 5.
But this didn’t happen!
Searches by both Forces were conducted early on May 6, but both Forces remained out of aircraft range at the time.
By the evening of May 6, the two opposing Carrier Forces had actually come within about 70 miles of each other, without ever realizing it?
And, also on May 6, the Japanese Port Moresby Invasion Force, sailing South had reached the Louisiade Archapeligo by nightfall.
They only needed to negotiate the Jomard Passage on May 7 to be in the Coral Sea and on their way to seize and secure Port Moresby.
On May 7, both Task Forces launched search aircraft at day break.
At the same time, Fletcher detached ADML Crace’s Group, now re-designated
Task Group 17.3, to the North West, towards New Guinea.
And, Crace’s mission was absolutely Clear!
He was to prevent any Japanese Forces sailing through the Jomard Passage and into the Coral Sea.
By late morning, both Carrier Forces had sighted each other, and so launched their aircraft to attack.
As it turned out, pilots from both Forces had mistakenly identified their targets believing they were attacking their opponent’s Fleet Carriers, but they were actually attacking other units?
The US attacked and sank the Japanese light carrier Shoho, and the Japanese sank the destroyer USS Sims resulting in significant loss of life, and also heavily damaging the Fleet Oiler, USS Neosho, which las a result, lost engine power, drifted and unfortunately sank 4 days later.
Beginning at day-break on May 8, both Forces launched aircraft in an all-out search endeavour.
At 10:30 AM their eureka moment came when both had sighted the opposing Task Force Fleet Carriers.
All available aircraft were launched by both Forces in an all-out attack.
When sighted, the Japanese heavy carriers quickly separated with Zuikaku disappearing into a rain squall under low cloud, while the Shokaku turned into the wind and began launching its own aircraft, managing to get almost all of them air-borne.
It was hit several times by US dive bombers but continued in the fight.
The Zuikaku launched all its available aircraft but not until late in the afternoon.
By night fall they had incurred significant aircraft losses at the hands of US Navy pilots, not to mention that many of their own inexperienced young pilots has also become lost! And, lost at night running out of fuel over the ocean, does not end particularly well!
When the engagements were all done, (and this was by nightfall on May 8), and when both sides had taken stock of their significant aircraft losses and ship damage, it is reasonable to say that the US carriers they did not fair as well as they had expected?
The USS Yorktown avoided all the torpedoes but one large bomb did penetrate the flight deck ship causing quite a bit of damage below decks.
The USS Lexington was not so fortunate however, being older, larger and less manoeuvrable, it was hit several times resulting in many explosions which caused very serious fires.
By early evening a decision was taken to abandon her and she later sank.
With both Forces having suffered heavy losses of both aircraft and aircrew, with Japan losing about 90% of theirs, and with carriers either sunk or damaged, the two Forces disengaged.
Historians all agreed they retired from the area because they had simply had enough!
While we all acknowledge that collateral damage inflicted on the enemy in time of War is crucial, we must never lose sight of the fact that men and women die!
During the Coral Sea engagements almost 2,000 men perished; Officers, Sailors and almost all of the Pilots.
The Shokaku limped back to Japan for major repair work, barely making it because it was so seriously damaged and the Zuikaku minus all but a hand-full of its aircraft, sailed for Rabaul Harbour.
The USS Yorktown returned to Pearl Harbour also for repairs, arriving there on May 27.
History later called the Battle in the Coral Sea a draw, and this was certainly NOT what either side had anticipated or had wanted!
And, because of the loss of his carrier air cover, Admiral Inoeu recalled his Port Moresby Invasion Fleet with the intention of attempting another invasion in early July.
We should note that this would actually be the closest the enemy would ever come to Port Moresby for the remainder of the war.
So, what was learned:
Well, it became quite obvious that the future of NAVAL Warfare will depend heavily on the use of carrier borne aircraft.
(At the outset for this conflict, both Forces each had some 120 aircraft embarked).
In other words, a new kind of over the horizon warfare had emerged leading to the construction of many large Fleet Carriers.
Indeed, aircraft carriers would quickly become the capital ship of choice for many NAVY’s around the world, including Australia up until the mid-1980’s, when arguably a poor decision was taken because we have been devoid of a carrier since then!
A Summary of the Battle in the Coral Sea would be as follows:
The Imperial Japanese Navy inflicted considerably more damage, sinking 63,000 tons versus 19 1/2, so it could be argued that it was a victory for Japan, but in reality, the outcome was very clearly a strategic victory for the Allies, AND for three very valid reasons:
First:
We had forced the Japanese to turn back for the very first time in the war, and
this was seen as a much-needed morale boost for the Allies.
Second:
The United States had now clearly achieved air superiority in the South Pacific
Third:
As a consequence of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s significant aircraft AND aircrew losses, particularly aircraft from the Zuikaku, and the serious damage suffered to the Shokaku, neither Carrier was able to participate in the crucial Battle for Midway, just one month later, in June 1942.
It was here where Japan lost all 4 of its remaining Heavy Carriers which was not only disastrous for them in this battle but signalled the beginning of the end of their Navy, which further prevented them from attempting a second Port Moresby invasion from the sea.
This resulted in their ill-fated land offensive to capture Moresby via the Owen Stanley mountains using the Kokoda Track.
And just two months later, the Allies took advantage of Japan’s strategic vulnerability in the South Pacific and launched the Guadalcanal Campaign.
From an Australian perspective, Port Moresby remained in Australia’s hands, and most importantly we were released from the very real likelihood of our homeland being invaded.
SUMMARY:
The Coral Sea engagements were the key precursors for the Allied victories at Midway, at Guadalcanal, at Hollandia and at Leyete in the Philippines sometime later; the outcomes of which collectively resulted in the end of the line for Japan’s SE Asia Economic Prosperity Sphere.
In concluding:
